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Abstract This paper discusses J.S. Mill’s distinction
between higher and lower pleasures, and suggests that
recent neuroscientific evidence counts against it.
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In Plato’s Republic ([1]: 580d-588a), Socrates suggests
that there is a particular kind of pleasure peculiar to each
part of the human soul, taken respectively in profit,
honour, and knowledge and its acquisition. When de-
ciding on their relative value, Socrates suggests, we
should listen only to the person whose soul is governed
by reason, since the philosopher’s position is based on
experience of the various types of pleasure, on reason,
and on argument. The philosopher’s view is that ‘lower’
pleasure is far less valuable than the higher, and that we
should pursue it only in so far as it is necessary for
survival. Socrates goes on to suggest that most ‘lower
pleasure’ isn’t really pleasure at all: it is merely absence
of pain, which looks positively pleasurable only because
of the contrast with pain. He calculates that the life of a
philosopher king will be 729 times as pleasant as that of
a tyrant (the life governed by desire for the lowest
pleasures). The mathematics here is hard to understand,
but Socrates’ position is a clear example of what we
shall call the higher/lower thesis, according to which
one kind of pleasure (in this case, intellectual pleasure)
is more valuable than another (bodily pleasure).
Socrates uses the higher/lower thesis to argue that the
life of the philosopher – which is good because of its
intellectual aspects – is also the most pleasant. John
Stuart Mill, almost certainly with this passage of the
Republic in mind, puts both theses to a quite different
use: to defend hedonism. In chapter 2 of Utilitarianism,
having outlined utilitarianism itself, Mill goes on to
discuss various objections to the doctrine. The first is
to its hedonism: that, in postulating no end other than
pleasure, hedonism is ‘utterly mean and grovelling… a
doctrine worthy only of swine’ ([2]: 2.3). Rather, we are
meant to assume, there are non-hedonistic goods avail-
able to human beings, and these are ‘higher’ than
pleasure.
The standard Epicurean response to this charge, Mill
claims, is to draw a distinction between the pleasures
available only to human beings and those available also
to non-humans (2.4):
Human beings have faculties more elevated than
the animal appetites, and when once made con-
scious of them, do not regard anything as happi-
ness which does not include their gratification…
[T]here is no known Epicurean theory of life
which does not assign to the pleasures of the
intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of
the moral sentiments, a much higher value as
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Mill claims that most utilitarian writers have ranked
mental over bodily pleasures primarily on the basis of
certain accidental features, such as permanence or cost.
He does not object to such a ranking but insists that
utilitarians might also have taken the ‘higher ground’:
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to
recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are
more desirable and more valuable than others. It
would be absurd that while, in estimating all other
things, quality is considered as well as quantity,
the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to
depend on quantity alone.
It is important to note that by ‘quantity’ here, Mill
does not mean ‘quantity of pleasantness’. The end of
paragraph 2.8 – in which he contrasts quality with
quantity as understood in terms of intensity – makes it
clear that he has in mind intensity; and again intensity
here is to be equated not with degree of pleasantness, but
with the intensity of the pleasurable sensation itself. The
degree of pleasantness will rise with intensity, but will
be determined by other factors – not least, duration: a
longer enjoyable experience, other things equal, is more
pleasant, and hence more choiceworthy, than a shorter.
But factors other than duration may also be relevant, and
this brings in the notion of quality. It is almost certain
that Mill would have included the pleasures of classical
music among the higher pleasures: they are available
only to humans, and involve the feelings and the imag-
ination, as well as the intellect. Consider, for example,
the ‘extreme pleasure’ Mill ‘drew from the delicious
melodies’ of Weber’s Oberon, when recovering from
his depressive illness of 1827–8 ([3]: 122). This pleasure
is higher than that of, say, lemonade on a hot day
because of its nature, and its being higher results in its
being more pleasant, despite any greater intensity that
might be found in the experience of lemonade.
Mill resurrects Socrates’s epistemological argument,
claiming that whether or not a pleasure is higher is a
matter for ‘competent judges’ (2.5–6, 8). But he goes
beyond Socrates in introducing a discontinuity into the
assessment of higher pleasures:
If one of the two [pleasures] is, by those who are
competently acquainted with both, placed so far
above the other that they prefer it, even though
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of
discontent, and would not resign it for any quan-
tity of the other pleasure which their nature is
capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the
preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so
far outweighing quantity as to render it, in com-
parison, of small account.
The details of Mill’s view are not entirely clear. But
the general gist seems to be that human beings, who
experience pleasures of the intellect and so on, would
not give these pleasures up for ‘the fullest allowance of a
beast’s pleasures’.
Mill’s argument is meant, perhaps, not as a direct
response to the anti-Epicurean objection, but as an at-
tempt to defuse it. The anti-Epicureans appear to believe
that the life recommended by Epicureans is one of
animal or bodily pleasure, whereas in fact Epicureans
will recommend just the kind of life the objectors find
most valuable, in which intellectual and other forms of
higher pleasure are fully, indeedmaximally, represented.
There is of course more work to be done, since, as we
understand the anti-Epicureans, they are claiming not
merely that pleasure is bestial, but that intellectual ac-
tivities and so on are valuable independently of pleasure.
That work Mill does later in Utilitarianism, in the third
stage of his notorious ‘proof’ of utilitarianism, accord-
ing to which we desire nothing other than pleasure
(4.4–11). But even at this point in the argument he might
hope that at least some of those who have accepted the
anti-Epicurean conclusion will give it up once they
recognize that hedonists can place superior human plea-
sures in a category quite separate from bodily pleasures.
At this point, we need to consider how pleasure is
understood from the philosophical perspective. On the
most straightforward understanding, pleasure is a feel-
ing. It has been common in recent years for philosophers
to distinguish between internalist accounts of pleasure,
according to which pleasure is an introspectively dis-
cernible sensation common to all pleasurable experi-
ences, and externalist accounts, according to which
there is no such pleasurable ‘feeling tone’ but pleasures
consist in experiences towards which the subjects have a
certain pro-attitude (such as that the experience contin-
ue) (see [4]: 87–91). Consider, say, the pleasure of
listening to Oberon. Internalists will claim that the lis-
tener experiences a certain sensation, that of pleasure;
externalists will deny that, claiming that she experiences
the sound of the music, and takes a positive attitude
toward it.
This example brings out, we suggest, the main prob-
lem with externalism. It fails properly to capture the idea
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that pleasure is a feeling. The most that can be salvaged
from such accounts is the idea that pleasure is the feeling
of having an experience towards which the subject has
the relevant pro-attitude. But even this relic of external-
ism should be rejected, since it fails to explain the
common case in which someone justifies the attitude
in question with reference to the pleasurableness of the
experience.1
Support for externalism is often sought in the fact
that pleasures – that is, pleasurable experiences –
differ greatly in kind from another: compare appreci-
ating Oberon, drinking lemonade on a hot day, and
playing basketball. But internalists will of course not
deny this. The fact that experiences differ in kind fails
to show that their being pleasurable does not consist
in a single felt quality. People’s comparative judge-
ments seem to bear this out. Having spent a few
hours engaged in the three activities just mentioned,
I might well rank the Oberon as more enjoyable than
the lemonade, and the lemonade as more enjoyable
than the basketball. I might say: ‘I got more pleasure
from the Oberon than from either of the other two
activities. The Oberon, that is, was the most pleasur-
able’. The error of externalists who rely on the great
variation that is found in pleasurable experiences
could be seen as a failure to distinguish between
pleasures and pleasure (see [5]). My pleasures differ
greatly; one important thing they have in common is
that they all involve pleasure. And it is their all
involving pleasure that explains why we call them
pleasures.
Internalism, understood in its most straightforward
form, seems on the face of it to be in some tension with
the higher/lower thesis. In so far as pleasures are valu-
able as pleasures, it seems that they all involve the same
sensation, pleasure. But perhaps things are more com-
plicated. There may be, perhaps, two kinds of sensation
in play – higher pleasantness, and lower pleasantness –
and the mistake of those who deny the higher/lower
thesis consists in failing to see the distinction between
the two and perhaps also how one kind of sensation
cannot, from the evaluative point of view, simply be
traded against the other.
Here it might be worth shifting the debate into an-
other discipline. If there are two such sensations, we
might expect them, purely on the basis of supervenience
considerations, to differ significantly in their underlying
physiological features. If we found that the brain states
underlying the pleasantness of higher pleasures were
radically different from those underlying that of lower
pleasures, this would be major piece of evidence in
favour of the higher/lower thesis, or at least in favour
of the view that denying that thesis based on internalism
would too hasty.
What, then, do we know at this point about the
neuroscience of pleasure? Consider two possible views
of pleasure and the brain. The first we might call the
bolt-on view, according to which experiences become
pleasurable through the activation of a certain pleasure
circuit, or certain circuits, common to all pleasurable
experiences. Listening to music, drinking, and playing
sport become pleasurable simply through the addition,
or the bolting on, of the activation of the pleasure circuit
to the original experience. On the dissimilarity view,
however, the bolt-on position is false. There is no single
pleasure circuit, or set of pleasure circuits, common to
all pleasures. The proponent of the bolt-on hypothesis
might claim, for example, that the sensation of pleasure
evolved first in connection with certain activities that
had high survival value, such as those of eating and sex,
but then later became correlated with other experiences,
such as those of music or playing games. According to
the dissimilarity view, this has not happened, since the
underlying physiology of pleasantness differs between
different pleasures.
It should be obvious that the bolt-on view makes the
higher/lower thesis much harder for a hedonist like Mill
to maintain. Much of the neuroscientific evidence is of
course not yet in,2 but at present the tenor of research
suggests that the neural substrate of pleasure in quite
different kinds of activity is quite similar. According to
Kent Berridge and Morten Kringelbach ([8]: 649; see
also [9]: 4; [10]: 2):
The experience of one pleasure often seems very
different from another. Eating delicious foods,
experiencing romantic or sexual pleasures, using
addictive drugs, listening to music, or seeing a
loved one: each feels unique. The only psycho-
logical feature in common would seem that all are
pleasant. However, the difference in one’s subjec-
tive experiences is not necessarily a good guide to
the underlying neural mechanisms. Those neural
mechanisms may overlap to a surprising degree.
1 For further discussion, see [6]: 103–11. 2 For a good survey, see [7].
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Over the last decades, a growing set of results
from neuro-imaging studies have suggested that
many diverse rewards activate a shared or over-
lapping brain system: a ‘common currency’ re-
ward network of interacting brain regions. Plea-
sures of food, sex, addictive drugs, friends and
loved ones, music, art, and even sustained states
of happiness can produce strikingly similar pat-
terns of brain activity. These shared reward net-
works include anatomical regions of prefrontal
cortex, including portions of orbitofrontal, insula,
and anterior cingulate cortices, as well as often
subcortical limbic structures such as NAc, ventral
pallidum (VP), and amygdala …. An implication
of the common currency hypothesis is that in-
sights into brain hedonic substrates gained by
experiments using one kind of pleasure, such as
food ‘liking’, may apply to many other pleasures
too.
No significant disagreement with these claims is
represented in recent neuroscientific literature, and last
year Berridge received an award for Distinguished Sci-
entific Contribution from the American Psychological
Association. In other words, current neuroscience seems
to favour the bolt-on thesis, and hence the denial, for the
present at least, of the higher/lower thesis. Note also
three further points.
First, pleasure-responses in many different kinds of
activity, including intellectual and bodily activities, of-
ten overlap, the most obvious response, of course, being
the smile. This suggests that they are at least using the
same output pathways, and that we might reasonably
expect the system generating the pleasure to be the same
in each case.
Second, and more significantly, evolutionary theory
suggests that we should expect there to be substantial
neural overlap between the circuits underlying both
kinds of pleasure. Evolution is a tinkerer, and parsimo-
nious in so far as it would not ‘waste’ resources on
developing new circuitry when it could build on that
which already existed. To date, no evidence has been
found of divergent networks for processing a particular
kind of pleasure, such as intellectual pleasure.
Third, and relatedly, consider the commensuration of
different kinds of pleasure. From a computational point
of view, rather than having separate circuits, it would be
far more efficient to have a common currency of plea-
sure, which could be used for the comparisons needed for
decision-making. In order effectively to allocate brain
resources it is important for the brain at all times to try
to optimize the energy spent on pursuing things allowing
survival as individuals and as a species (Kringelbach,
Green, and Aziz [11]). We need to be able to decide
when we can safely listen to Oberon or play basketball
at the expense of looking after our progeny or staving off
starvation. It might be objected that when making deci-
sions we do not standardly compare actual pleasure or
pleasures, that is, currently experienced pleasure or cur-
rent pleasurable experiences, but representations. This
claim is, of course, true, but it remains the case that these
representations are of pleasurable experiences, and that
comparing two representations may be simpler if they are
representations of the same thing. Other things equal, if
you ask me to rank in quality two pieces of fruit, my
choice will be easier if you show me two pictures of two
different apples than if you showme a picture of an apple
and a picture of an orange.
In other words, the most plausible hypothesis is that,
though higher pleasures of course involve higher-level
brain activity, especially cognitive activity, there is no
good reason for thinking that the pleasure of higher
pleasures does not correlate with the same neural net-
works as lower, sensory pleasures. But it may now be
argued that the combination of activating the pleasure-
circuits and activating certain cognitive processes leads
to an entirely different kind of experience, which is in a
sense more than the sum of its parts. An intellectual or
higher pleasure is still, perhaps, the ‘bolting on’ of the
activation of some independent kind of pleasure-circuit
– as found in sensory pleasures – to higher-level, cog-
nitive experiences, but its subjective nature has been
transformed through cognition. Further, onemight claim
that phenomenal consciousness is a feature of the whole
brain (see [12]: 229). And of course it will be denied by
no one that the neural substrate of intellectual pleasures
differs from that of bodily pleasures, in so far as intel-
lectual and bodily experiences correlate with different
parts of the brain. So it may well be that human con-
scious experience of pleasure is different not only in
degree but also in kind from that of other animals,
primarily because of the advanced cognitive abilities
of the human brain.
At this point, it should be noted first that humans are
not particularly good at introspection. We have the
ability to fool both others and ourselves about our
subjective experiences and motives. Nevertheless, ac-
tivities combining sensory and social pleasures such as
those involved in a dinner party could have a synergistic
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effect on the higher-order pleasures experienced in
humans, which might be hard to find in other animals.
But until we understand a lot more about the effects on
phenomenal consciousness of the co-instantiation of
different kinds of brain activity (such as cognition and
the activation of the pleasure-circuits), this question
must remain largely one for introspection and a priori
argument.
In our experience, the kind of pleasurewe take in, say,
drinking lemonade is pretty much exactly the same as
that we take in listening to music. Those experiences as a
whole are very different from one another, of course, but
not in so far as they are pleasurable. Both experiences
feel good or ‘positive’ – and that feeling good, if we
understand ‘feeling’ in a broad sense, just is what plea-
sure amounts to.3 And this, as we have suggested above,
explains why it is sometimes so easy to compare two
very different kinds of pleasurable experience.
Further, the parsimony-related arguments above apply
also at the level of the whole brain. If there is some
phenomenal difference between intellectual and bodily
pleasures which cannot be put down to the different
neural correlates of cognition and sensory experience,
that difference must correlate with certain physically
realized relations between cognition and the pleasure-
circuits on the one hand, or sensory experience and the
pleasure-circuits on the other hand, that do not consist
merely in co-existence. And these physical substrates
would themselves have to be of different kinds, to explain
the difference at the phenomenal level. But we would
expect evolution not to produce such physical substrates
unless they are necessary. And as far as we can see, there
is no reason to think that mere co-existence (as described
by the bolt-on view) would not be functionally sufficient.
Further, important phenomenal differences, if they corre-
late with the lack of any common neural currency, might
be expected to make comparisons of pleasures more
difficult than they appear to be, and themselves more
costly in terms of expenditure of evolutionary energy.
In summary, then, neuroscientific evidence for the
higher/lower thesis is currently lacking. This does not
mean that it may not emerge when and if new brain
imaging technologies and methodologies of interpreting
images emerge. But what is clear is that the existing data
show that: 1) intellectual pleasure and bodily pleasure
share final common pathways in the ensuing reactions to
pleasurable stimuli irrespective of type; 2) evolution
appears to have conserved and re-used the neural plea-
sure mechanisms used for bodily pleasures when deal-
ing with intellectual, social, and other more complex
pleasures; and 3) the existence of a common currency
allows for pleasures of different kinds to be compared
and acted upon.4
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